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Can pragmatism function in administrative law?
Jocelyn Stacey and Alice Woolley
Introduction
Administrative law is complex, both normatively and practically. Practical complexity
arises from the enormity of the administrative state. Across Canada, hundreds of administrative
decision-makers implement and oversee a wide range of regulatory initiatives. Each is constituted
by its own legislation, operates according to its own formal and informal norms, makes
substantive decisions on a range of issues, and is subject to judicial review to ensure that its
decisions are rendered fairly and in accordance with law.

The plurality of administrative

decision-makers makes it practically difficult to assert a single principle or set of principles that
govern judicial oversight of those decision-makers.
Normative complexity arises from questions about the interactions between our
institutions of government. How can administrative decision-makers ensure their decisions have
democratic and legal authority? And how do courts, on review, respect multiple constitutional
values including legislative supremacy, the separation of powers, and the rule of law? The
normative complexity then gives rise to a further practical complexity: how do courts resolve and
respect these difficult normative questions without increasing the cost and complexity of judicial
review? These institutional dilemmas become especially vexing given that the parties to judicial
review are fundamentally indifferent to the underlying normative questions, caring only about the
fair and just resolution of their own administrative problems.
This article draws out the ways in which Justice Rothstein grappled with this complexity.
It argues that Justice Rothstein took a pragmatic approach to complexity in administrative law.
Specifically, he sought to articulate a framework for judicial review that was workable for
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administrative decision-makers, litigants, their lawyers and reviewing courts. In addition, he
looked to past experience with judicial review, evidenced in judicial precedent, rather than
focusing on abstract theoretical norms.
Taking that approach was not without risks. Purely pragmatic approaches to judicial
review have tended to increase, rather than decrease complexity in administrative law.1 They have
also failed to resolve normative problems satisfactorily.

Justice Rothstein’s commitment to

pragmatism did not, however, fail in this way. Rather, we argue that it reshaped the modern
architecture of judicial review in a way that is both more practically workable and more
normatively coherent than in the past. He created greater simplicity and clarity in the standard of
review analysis, while also ensuring that that analysis was able to address the key normative
questions about the appropriate division of responsibility between the court and the administrative
decision-maker. Ultimately, his quest for pragmatism led him closer to a principled approach, in
which judges are always required to pay respectful attention to the substance and context of
administrative decisions.
The Supreme Court’s administrative law jurisprudence remains imperfect. Giving
respectful attention to administrative decision-making, while also pushing administrative
decision-makers to justify their decisions properly, challenged Justice Rothstein, and continues to
challenge the Court. This is a particular problem when the administrative decision-maker offers
inadequate reasons or only one side participates in the judicial review such that the application is
not thoroughly contested. Under these conditions, it is not always clear how a court ought to
accord deference to administrative decision-makers while also ensuring that the individuals
affected by their decisions are treated fairly by the state. To the extent that he himself avoided

1

We offer a brief synopsis of this history in Part I infra. See also, e.g., Paul Daly, “The Struggle for
Deference in Canada” in Mark Elliott and Hanna Wilberg eds, The Scope and Intensity of Substantive
Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 297; David Mullan, “Establishing
the Standard of Review: The Struggle for Complexity” (2004) 17 Can J Admin L & Prac 59.

2

these pitfalls, and adopted an architecture that, while pragmatic, pushed the courts towards the
normative model of deference as respect, Justice Rothstein left Canadian administrative law in a
considerably better place at the end of his Supreme Court tenure than where he found it.
Part I sets the stage for examining Justice Rothstein’s administrative law jurisprudence by
introducing the normative and practical complexities that arise in the context of judicial review,
the mixed results of the Supreme Court’s attempts to address these complexities, and finally, what
a satisfactory resolution to the normative and practical problems of judicial review ought to
include. It argues that David Dyzenhaus’s model of deference as respect – a model to which the
Supreme Court has frequently referred – provides a compelling approach for coping with the
complexity of administrative law. Deference as respect requires judges to pay respectful attention
to the reasons offered by the administrative decision-maker, while also emphasizing the
importance of administrative decision-makers providing reasoned justifications for their decisions.
The theory underlying deference as respect also offers a potential resolution to the normative
tension between legislative supremacy and the rule of law, which has bedeviled much of the
Court’s administrative law jurisprudence.
Part II then turns to Justice Rothstein’s jurisprudence, setting out his response(s) to
complexity in administrative law. It argues that Rothstein’s approach shares three important
objectives with Dyzenhaus. First, Justice Rothstein sought to minimize the role of the standard of
review analysis, and to focus the attention of administrative bodies, litigants and the courts on the
substance of the decision before them. Second, Justice Rothstein wanted administrative decisionmakers to offer cogent reasons for their decisions. And third, he demonstrated a clear willingness
to share the project of interpreting law with administrative decision-makers when they reasoned
in this way. At the same time, however, Justice Rothstein’s focus on pragmatism remained intact.
He remained attuned to the potential injustices and unfairness that can arise from the practical
complexities of administrative law, leading him, in some cases, to depart from the methodological
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approach suggested by Dyzenhaus’s notion of deference as respect. But even when he did so, his
reasoning remained oriented toward the underlying concerns of deference as respect.
To understand these aspects of Justice Rothstein’s jurisprudence, this Part considers first
his opinion in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa.2 It casts this opinion in a new light,
suggesting that it can be understood as consistent with the three aims that underscore his
approach to judicial review. It then turns to the architecture of judicial review that Rothstein’s
decisions otherwise reflect, both in terms of his structure for how courts should approach
identifying the standard of review and in terms of how he approached the act of deferential
review in specific cases. Finally, we review the cases in which Justice Rothstein seemed, on the
surface, to depart from respectful deference, to show how he reconciled the normative and
practical challenges that arise when administrative decision-makers offer incomplete reasons.
At the end of the day, Justice Rothstein’s pragmatic approach to administrative law has
allowed courts and administrative decision-makers to occupy a shared space in which
administrative decision-makers justify their legal decisions and courts respect the justifications
that administrative decision-makers offer. The dangers of administrative law remain: the Court
always risks unwarranted interference or unjustified deference. But for now the architecture of
judicial review developed by Justice Rothstein, and his conscientious adherence to respectful
deference in all but a few exceptional cases, have pointed the courts in the right direction.
I.

The Normative and Practical Problems of Judicial Review
In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court articulated the normative problem of judicial review:
Judicial review seeks to address an underlying tension between the rule of law
and the foundational democratic principle, which finds an expression in the
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initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create various administrative bodies
and endow them with broad powers.3
In other words, how does a court uphold the rule of law – by ensuring all exercises of public
authority are authorized by law – and simultaneously respect legislative supremacy when the
legislature has stated that an administrative body – not the courts – has a mandate to determine
questions of law?
The vexing and enduring nature of this tension can be traced back to an “orthodox”
interpretation of A.V. Dicey,4 whose work on the English constitution casts a long shadow over
Canadian administrative law.5 The orthodox interpretation is, in brief, that Dicey envisioned dual
monopolies: a legislative monopoly over the making of law and a judicial monopoly over the
interpretation of law. This vision of competing monopolies precluded any independent role for
the administrative state. Given that the administrative state exists, however, a tension arises that
his work does not obviously resolve. When a legislature delegates to an administrative decisionmaker the authority to determine questions of law, should the determining factor be the legislative
monopoly over law-making or the judicial monopoly over legal interpretation? The court’s
monopoly over statutory interpretation clashes with the legislature’s explicit delegation of that
authority to an administrative body. Yet the very fact of legislative delegation also includes some
inherent limits on the exercise of delegated power. Privative clauses, which purport to remove the
Court’s supervisory role and give the administrative decision-maker the final say on legal
questions, only enhance this problem.6 The challenge for the courts is how to address this
apparent tension by determining when it is appropriate to defer to the decisions of administrative
bodies and when it is appropriate to intervene.
3

Dunsmuir v New Brunswick (Board of Management), 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 at para 32.
Mark D Walters, “Dicey on Writing the Law of the Constitution” (2012) 32 Oxford J Legal Stud 21 at 22.
5
David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Michael Taggart ed,
The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 279 at 280 [Dyzenhaus “Politics”].
National Corn Growers Assn v Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 SCR 1324 at para 74, 74 DLR (4th)
449,Wilson J.
6
Rethinking, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 199.
7
Rethinking, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 198-199.
4
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a. Past Judicial Approaches
The Supreme Court of Canada has a long history of trying to address this normative
tension without confronting it head-on. One solution explored by the courts in the early days of
the administrative state was for judges to attempt to distinguish “jurisdictional questions” (or the
legislated boundaries of the administrative tribunal’s authority) from those questions falling
inside those boundaries. On jurisdictional questions, Courts were highly interventionist,
substituting their own interpretations with no deference to the administrative decision-maker; on
questions not considered jurisdictional administrative decision-makers were effectively free from
judicial scrutiny. In practice, this attempt to grant “free rein within bounds” was unable to
maintain the court’s interpretive authority while also granting autonomy to administrative
decision-makers within their jurisdictional mandate. There was no clear basis on which to
distinguish ordinary questions of law on which judges would defer, from questions of jurisdiction
on which judges would substitute their own interpretation. In the result, judges tended to view all
matters of legal interpretation as questions of jurisdiction, and consequently refused to defer to
administrative decision-makers’ interpretations of law.7
The Court’s 1979 decision in CUPE v New Brunswick8 ushered in a new era in judicial
review. In CUPE, the Court urged judges to exercise restraint in identifying questions of
jurisdiction. The Court stated that a jurisdictional question is only one that goes to the “scope of
the Board’s capacity to hear and decide the issues before them.”9 The Court acknowledged that
statutory texts are frequently ambiguous, lending themselves to multiple permissible
interpretations, and that the Courts needed to share this task of legal interpretation with
administrative bodies. The core idea in CUPE was that deference ought to be assessed based on
the expertise of the administrative decision-maker, the nature of the question before it, the
7

Rethinking, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 198-199.
[1979] 2 SCR 227.
9I
Ibid. at 234.
8
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existence of a privative clause, and the purpose of the administrative decision-maker in question.
This approach, refined and reinforced in subsequent cases, became known as the “pragmatic and
functional” test for determining the standard of review, and it directed courts to consider each of
these factors in order to determine the legislature’s intentions in regard to judicial review. 10
Courts were to weigh these factors in order to determine whether to review a decision on the basis
of a standard of correctness, reasonableness, or patent unreasonableness.
The problem with the pragmatic and functional approach was that it did not provide a
clear map to allow a judge to navigate the normative tension between the judge’s interpretive role
and the legislative grant of authority to an administrative decision-maker. Indeed, it arguably
elided this tension because it allowed courts to reach a conclusion about deference without
interrogating whether the administrative decision-maker or the court had greater legitimacy to
answer a legal question. The court claimed that the pragmatic and functional test would discern
legislative intention around deference, but it never satisfactorily explained why or how that was
the case, either generally or in any specific instance. Nor did the Court explain why legislative
intent should be conclusive in all cases, given the inherent contradiction in legislative intention
explained above. The pragmatic and functional analysis had a Houdini-esque quality; it produced
a standard for judicial review, but the foundations of that standard were opaque, and the Court’s
stance on the normative dilemma unclear.
Perhaps as a consequence, the pragmatic and functional approach generated an
increasingly confusing and inconsistent jurisprudence. Even within specific decisions, levels of
court could not agree on the appropriate standard of review, and nor could judges writing for the
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See, most notably: U.E.S., Local 298 v Bibeault [1988] 2 SCR 1048; Canada (Director of Investigation
and Research) v Southam Inc. [1997] 1 SCR 748; Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers)
[1994] 2 SCR 557; Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop [1993] 1 SCR 554; Pushpanathan v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982; Law Society of New Brunswick v Ryan 2003
SCC 20; Dr Q v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia 2003 SCC 19.

7

majority, concurrence, or dissents within the Supreme Court.11 These problems were compounded
by the Court’s development of three standards of review. In addition to unpredictability about
which of those standards applied in any given case, the difference between them was uncertain.
As Justice LeBel cogently observed in his judgment in Toronto (City) v CUPE, Local 79:
From the beginning, patent unreasonableness at times shaded uncomfortably
into what should presumably be its antithesis, the correctness review. Moreover,
it is increasingly difficult to distinguish from what is ostensibly its less
deferential counterpart, reasonableness simpliciter.12
The pragmatic and functional approach to judicial review created problems beyond its
incoherence and unpredictability.

It forced lawyers and their clients to dedicate significant

resources to an issue ancillary to the problem being brought to the court for review. Where, for
example, a party was looking to the court to assess fundamental questions such as the meaning of
a human rights statute, the authority of a professional body to consider matters of equality or
religious freedom, or the effect of international agreements on domestic immigration law, parties
and the court could not focus solely on the merits of those issues. Rather, they had to begin by
navigating the complex jurisprudence related to standard of review, engaging in what Justice
Binnie later memorably referred to as the “law office metaphysics” of judicial review.13
The Court itself recognized the inadequacies of the pragmatic and functional approach,
and sought to develop a different method for identifying the standard of review in its decision in
Dunsmuir. While the Court, as quoted above, recognized the underlying normative tension, its
approach did nothing to resolve it. While the majority purported to articulate a new approach to
judicial review, it determined the standard of review through the equivalent of the pragmatic and
functional analysis. Indeed, the judgment of the majority in Dunsmuir seemed, even at the time
11

See, e.g., Mossop, supra note 10; Trinity Western University v British Columbia College of Teachers
2001 SCC 31.
12
2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 SCR 77 at para 17.
13
Dunsmuir, supra note 3 at para 12.
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of its release, unlikely to simplify or reduce the “law office metaphysics” associated with judicial
review. As written, while it reduced the number of standards of review available, it did not reduce
the complexity of the process for identifying them. Following the majority’s new approach,
parties and courts could find ample room for lengthy argument, evidence and disagreement on the
appropriate standard of review in a given case, evidenced by the fact that the Court divided on the
appropriate standard to be applied in the very case that was to clarify the new approach to judicial
review. Finally, and most importantly for our purposes here, the majority in Dunsmuir simply
reiterated the unstable compromise of CUPE and the pragmatic and functional analysis. It added
some gloss to the process by which a court should determine the standard of review, but it did not
provide a stable or coherent way for a court to navigate the normative tension of judicial review
in a particular case.14 It simply used past cases or the standard of review analysis (i.e. the
pragmatic and functional test) to generate an answer to the standard of review question, while still
not explaining how doing so would generate a response that resolved the tension between
legislative power over law’s content and judicial power over its interpretation.
The ambivalence evident in Dunsmuir and the cases that preceded it is understandable.
Judicial power to interpret law and the legislative power to determine law’s content conflict in an
administrative state, and that conflict is manifest in judicial review. That is not to say, however,
that there is no way to address this conflict. Specifically, it may be possible to reduce the tension
between the judicial and legislative roles in maintaining the rule of law by rejecting the binary
understanding that has underpinned much of the Court’s jurisprudence. Instead, we can view
these respective roles as complimentary and, to a significant extent, as co-extensive.
b. Dyzenhaus’s Theory of Deference as Respect

14

See in general, Alice Woolley “The Metaphysical Court: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick and Standard of
Review” (2008) 21 Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice 259.
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The concept of “deference as respect,” first articulated by David Dyzenhaus, shows how
the tension between the judicial and legislative roles is more apparent than real.15 The crux of
deference as respect is that judges must pay respectful attention to the reasoning process of
administrative decision-makers. In Dyzenhaus’s view, there is no such thing as a correctness
standard of review because there is no “plain fact” of legislative intent to which courts have some
unique insight. 16 Statutes always have an interpretive context, and when the legislature delegates
authority to an administrative decision-maker, that decision-maker’s reasoning becomes part of
its interpretative context.17 On this view, it would never be sensible for “a reviewing court….not
[to] show deference to the decision maker’s reasoning process [and to] rather undertake its own
analysis of the question.” 18 Every judicial review ought to examine the reasons of the
administrative decision-maker and “operate with a presumption that the reasons offered by the
tribunal for its decision could justify a decision, which is not necessarily the decision that the
court would have reached had it operated in a vacuum.”19
This model of judicial review arguably resolves the underlying tension between
legislative supremacy and the rule of law. Courts respect legislative supremacy by always being
willing to defer to administrative decision-makers; they cannot assert a judicial monopoly over a
matter that has been delegated to a frontline administrative decision-maker. At the same time,
courts maintain the rule of law by requiring that decision-makers offer adequate justification for
their decisions. Deference as respect imposes obligations on administrative decision-makers just

15

Dyzenhaus “Politics”, supra note 5.
David Dyzenhaus, “Dignity in Administrative Law: Judicial Deference in a Culture of Justification”
(2012) 17 Rev Const Stud 87 [Dyzenhaus “Dignity”] at 109.
17
Dyzenhaus “Politics”, supra note 5 at 303.
18
Dunsmuir, supra note 3 at para 50.
19
David Dyzenhaus, "Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law" (2002)
27 Queen's LJ 445 at 495 [“Fundamental Values”]. In Dyzenhaus “Dignity”, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined. at 113, he compares this approach to existing standards of correctness and
reasonableness review: “Hence, the thought that deference as respect might be either less or more intrusive
than Dunsmuir doctrine is misleading, for deference as respect requires of officials that they ensure that
their reasons do justify their conclusions and of judges that that issue becomes their sole concern on review.”
20
Dunsmuir, supra note 3 at para 48; Mossop, supra note 10 (per Justice L’Heureux-Dubé); Ryan, supra
16
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as much as it insists on respectful deference from courts; deference – like respect – must be
earned. And when administrative decision-makers earn the respect of the courts through the
practice of giving adequate reasons, courts maintain the rule of law by protecting the citizenry
from arbitrary public decisions. On this view, public decisions gain their democratic and legal
authority through a process of public justification in which all public decision-makers offer
reasons that justify their decisions in light of the constitutional, statutory and common law
context in which they operate.
The Supreme Court has consistently cited Dyzenhaus’s work with approval and, at least
with respect to reasonableness review, has endorsed the position that judges owe respectful
deference to the decision-making processes of administrative decision-makers. 20 The high
watermark of this endorsement was Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
where the Court articulated nearly the full theory underpinning deference as respect. 21 In
particular Baker stands for three important propositions: first, that those who will be significantly
impacted by an important administrative decision are entitled to reasons for that decision; second,
that a reasonable decision is one in which the reasons offered justify the outcome reached; and,
third, that a reviewing court must therefore examine the reasons for the decision to determine its
reasonableness. The Supreme Court quickly retreated from this position in subsequent decisions,
however, by stating that it is inappropriate for the Court to engage too closely with the substance
of the administrative decision-maker’s reasoning.22 Dunsmuir further confirmed that the Court
was not fully committed to the theory underpinning deference as respect, as reflected in the

20

Dunsmuir, supra note 3 at para 48; Mossop, supra note 10 (per Justice L’Heureux-Dubé); Ryan, supra
note 10. Its relationship to post-Dunsmuir cases is discussed in Part 2.
21
[1999] 2 SCR 817. Rethinking, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. provides a detailed analysis
of the theory underlying the decision in Baker.
22
Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3; Khosa, supra
note 2.
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majority’s explicit statement that there is an underlying tension between the rule of law and
legislative supremacy.23
The key, for our purposes, is the resolution through Dyzenhaus’s model of the practical
and normative complexities of judicial review. As we have seen, defence as respect resolves the
normative complexities by requiring that judges always approach their reviewing task with a
respectful frame of mind and with the objective of ensuring that administrative decisions are
justified. It promises also to resolve some of the practical complexities of judicial review by
requiring judges to always choose reasonableness as the standard of review, and to apply
reasonableness by examining whether the reasons for the decision justify the outcome.

It

encourages judicial efficiency both in identifying the standard of review and in applying that
standard to specific cases. This is not to say that respectful judicial review looks the same across
administrative decisions – interpretive contexts vary – but that the focus in each case should be on
the decision before the court for review, not on how to review it.
It is against this backdrop that Justice Rothstein’s administrative law jurisprudence
emerged. Almost all of the administrative law cases in which he participated were decided
subsequent to Dunsmuir; he did not write any administrative law judgments at the Supreme Court
prior to that case. Thus, Justice Rothstein’s administrative law jurisprudence at the Supreme
Court arose in a legal context in which the Court had continuously grappled with the proper
approach to determining standard of review but had not yet articulated an approach that resolved
the normative tension between judicial authority and legislative supremacy. The Court had failed
to simplify the process for assessing standard of review so as to allow courts and parties to focus
on the issues in the case. Yet at the same time the Court had, in the form of Dyzenhaus’s theory

23

Mark Walters queries whether the Supreme Court appreciates the theory underlying deference as respect:
Mark D Walters, “Respecting Deference as Respect: Rights, Reasonableness and Proportionality in
Canadian Administrative Law” Mark Elliott & Hanna Wilberg eds, The Scope and Intensity of Substantive
Review: Traversing Taggart's Rainbow, (Oxford: Hart Publishing) 395.
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of deference as respect, an approach to understanding judicial review that it endorsed and that
could conceivably provide it with a better way forward. By fully adopting a deference-as-respect
understanding of review, the Court could (i) eliminate the confusion of the standard of review
analysis and focus on the substance of the decision, (ii) require that administrative decisionmakers properly justify their decisions through reasons, and (iii) share the task of interpreting the
law by deferring to administrative decision-makers when their decisions are justified.

II.

Justice Rothstein’s Jurisprudence: The Quest for Simplicity
This Part assesses Justice Rothstein’s jurisprudence against Dyzenhaus’s theory of deference

as respect. The following sections, argue that, while Justice Rothstein never endorsed (or even
considered) the idea of deference as respect, his administrative law decisions can be understood
as seeking to resolve the normative and practical complexities of judicial review along the same
three lines as does Dyzenhaus’s theory. Justice Rothstein’s decisions did so in an appropriately
pragmatic fashion: incrementally and by learning from the past inadequacies in the Supreme
Court’s administrative law jurisprudence. These sections will also show how Rothstein’s
jurisprudence offers insight into how the Court can remain oriented toward the theory
underpinning deference as respect when faced with real-world complexities.
The sections make these arguments through assessment and analysis of: Justice Rothstein’s
judgment in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa;24 his reshaping of how courts ought
to approach identification of the standard of review to allow parties and courts to focus on the
substance of the dispute; his approach to deferential review which attends to the reasons that
administrative decision-makers offer for their decisions; and, finally, how he responded to some
of the pragmatic challenges that may arise in judicial review cases.
24

Supra note 2.
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Justice Rothstein did not employ respectful deference unthinkingly or uncritically, but he did
take it seriously. And as a consequence his overall approach to administrative law has moved the
Court’s administrative law jurisprudence in a positive direction toward resolving the normative
and practical complexities of judicial review.

a. Rethinking Khosa
The argument that Justice Rothstein’s administrative law decisions converge with
Dyzenhaus’s theory of deference as respect, seems likely to fail from its inception given his first
administrative law judgment subsequent to Dunsmuir: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v
Khosa.25 In Khosa, Rothstein argued that the presumptive standard of review for administrative
decisions on questions of law ought to be correctness. Absent an expressed legislative direction –
through enactment of a privative clause – courts ought to grant no deference to administrative
answers to legal questions.
Rothstein rejected the position that “the creation of expert tribunals automatically meant
that there was to be some limitation on the judicial review of the courts, in particular on questions
of law.”26 He argued that the tension identified by the courts between judicial and legislative
authority arose not from the fact of the administrative state, but rather from the enactment of
privative clauses; it was the privative clause that “gave rise to a tension between the two core
pillars of the public law system: legislative supremacy and the judicial enforcement of the law.”27

25

Supra note 2.
Ibid. at para 77.
27
Ibid. at para 81.
26
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As a consequence, absent “a privative clause, courts have always retained a supervisory judicial
review role.”28
Justice Rothstein recognized that this position was inconsistent with many Supreme
Court decisions, but in his view those decisions obscured the “conceptual clarity” that the Court
was striving for in Dunsmuir, and should not be followed. Rather, while administrative decisionmakers should be granted deference on questions of fact, policy, or mixed fact and law, courts
should have the last word on legal questions. That would ensure the consistent application of
legal principles across like cases, and respect the fact that “appellate and reviewing courts have
greater law-making expertise relative to trial judges and administrative decision-makers.”29 It
would also avoid arbitrariness in the administrative context arising from courts’ tendency to
assess expertise only through the nature of the tribunal as set out in its enabling statue, rather than
by conducting a “full review of its actual expertise.”30

The standard interpretation – and criticism – of Justice Rothstein’s opinion in Khosa is
that it is a throwback, an attempt to resurrect, albeit with some qualification, pre-CUPE judicial
overreach in administrative law. Justice Binnie for the majority claimed that Rothstein was trying
to “roll back the Dunsmuir clock to an era where some courts asserted a level of skill and
knowledge in administrative law matters which further experience showed they did not
possess.” 31 The standard criticism is plausible.

Both historically and in modern cases, the

adoption of the correctness standard created the risk that a court may impose legal interpretations

28

Ibid. at para 76.
Ibid. at para 90.
30
Ibid. at para 94.
31
Ibid. at para 26. See also: Gerald P Heckman “Substantive Review in Appellate Courts since Dunsmuir”
(2009) 47(4) Osgoode Hall LJ 751 at 763-66 and Audrey Maklin, “Standard of Review: Back to the
Future?” in Colleen M Flood and Lorne Sossin eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2d ed (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery Press, 2012) 279 at 305.
29
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that do not properly reflect the statutory and policy nuances of the administrative regime.32 Had
the Court accepted Rothstein’s position that courts ought to grant no deference on legal questions
absent a “strong” 33 privative clause, it seems reasonable to have predicted greater judicial
interference in the administrative state.
There may, however, be another way to understand Rothstein’s opinion in Khosa. What
his judgment would have essentially required is for courts to review administrative decisions in
the same way that appellate courts review trial decisions. Justice Rothstein expressly made this
connection, relying on the use of the correctness standard in appellate review of questions of law
to justify it as the default standard of review for administrative decisions absent a privative
clause.34 But when appellate courts review trial decisions they do not ignore what the trial judge
had to say, or the reasons offered.

In determining whether the trial judge made a correct

determination on a question of law, they provide respectful attention to the reasons offered by the
trial judge. This suggests that a court reviewing an administrative decision in the same way an
appellate court reviews a trial judgment would not ignore the administrative decision-maker’s
reasons, expertise and justifications in assessing whether the decision-maker reached the
appropriate legal outcome in a given case.
That judges applying a correctness standard in administrative law have tended not to pay
respectful attention to the administrative decision-maker’s approach reflects the historical context
in which many of them were written – historically, administrative decision-makers have been
neither trusted nor respected by the courts. In addition, the fact that correctness exists in contrast
to reasonableness means that a court adopting correctness review instead of reasonableness may

32

See, e.g., Alice Woolley, “‘Practical Necessity’ or ‘Highly Sophisticated Opportunism’? Judicial Review
and Rate Regulation After ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board)” (2006)
44 Alberta Law Review 445-458; “The Importance of ATCO Gas and Pipelines: A Response to Marty Kay”
(2007) 45(2) Alberta Law Review 515-520
33
Khosa, supra note 2 at para 74.
34
Ibid. at para 90.
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feel justified in interfering with the administrative decision in a way that a court adopting
correctness review as a default standard would not.
If this is the case, then Justice Rothstein’s opinion in Khosa ought not to be understood
merely as a throwback. Rather, had it been followed, it could have resulted in an administrative
law jurisprudence in which, first, parties could have directed their resources to the actual matter at
issue in a given case rather than to arguing about the standard of review. Second, the correctness
standard could have evolved to mirror something closer to the appellate review of trial judgments,
in which the trial judge’s reasons for a decision play a central role in the analysis. Third – and
this is admittedly both speculative and optimistic – it is possible that courts schooled in the
decades of administrative law jurisprudence and near-universal modern acceptance of the
legitimacy of the administrative state, could have considered the administrative decision-maker’s
reasons with awareness of that decision-maker’s superior knowledge of the broader policy and
factual context to which the law applies. This would require that administrative decision-makers
justify their decisions in ways that reflect that superior knowledge, thereby providing the actual
information about the decision-maker’s expertise that Justice Rothstein fairly noted is not
provided by the considerations assessed in the pragmatic and functional analysis.
Regardless – and this is the key point – it is not as obvious as often assumed that
Rothstein’s judgment in Khosa precludes the type of evolution in judicial review that we argued
in the prior section to be desirable. If Justice Rothstein’s approach in Khosa had been adopted in
a context in which courts did not forget the lessons learned from the failure of the pre-CUPE era,
it is possible that it could have created a way for courts and administrative decision-makers to
contemporaneously engage in legal interpretation – i.e., for administrative decision-makers to
justify their decisions, and for courts to respectfully account for those justifications in
determining questions of law.
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This case should not be overstated. By retaining two standards of review, Rothstein’s
approach in Khosa would not resolve the underlying normative problem of judicial review.35
Even if correctness had evolved, it could have continued to invite judicial over-reaching and to
raise further questions about the differences in substance between the two standards. It is also the
case that in a deference-as-respect model, administrative decision-makers’ interpretations of law
ought to be given greater consideration than those of a trial judge, because administrative
decision-makers have expertise and authority distinct from those of a trial court, including on
questions of law. Nonetheless, our point here is that Rothstein’s judgment in Khosa does not fit
as neatly into the pigeonhole into which it has traditionally been slotted.
This point is important not because Rothstein’s concurring reasons in Khosa require
defending. The opinion has no legal standing in current Canadian administrative law, and is in
the end only a small part of Rothstein’s Supreme Court jurisprudence.36 Rather, it is important
because when Khosa is understood in this way – as being about simplifying administrative law
but not about trying to push an agenda of judicial interference and activism – its fit with
Rothstein’s subsequent administrative law jurisprudence becomes clear. Because after Khosa, in
not a single case did Justice Rothstein argue for an expansion of correctness review. Even when
other judges expressed caution about expanding deferential review on questions of law, Justice
Rothstein did not join them.37 Rothstein instead sided with the majority – in 36 out of 42
judgments – and overwhelmingly favoured reasonableness review. Of the 34 cases in which
standard of review was at issue (i.e., which turned on substantive issues rather than procedural
ones) Justice Rothstein voted with the judgment imposing a reasonableness standard 25 times,
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and a partial reasonableness standard 5 times. That is, in close to 90% of his decisions, Rothstein
supported some form of reasonableness review.
So if Khosa is understood as a return to traditionalism, the only way to explain Justice
Rothstein’s subsequent jurisprudence is as capitulation or conversion. If, however, Khosa offered
both simplicity and at least the possibility – if implemented by modern judges who accept the
legitimacy of the administrative state – of courts reviewing legal determinations with respect for
the justifications offered by administrative decision-makers, then the decision can instead be
understood as a pragmatic step (even if a misstep) in Rothstein’s attempt to move judicial review
toward a resolution of its normative and practical complexities.

b. The New Architecture of the Standard of Review Analysis
Courts and commentators still cite Dunsmuir as the current watershed moment in
Canadian administrative law. Justice Rothstein’s decisions have, however, pushed the Supreme
Court to move away from Dunsmuir in three notable respects: the Court created a presumption of
reasonableness as the appropriate standard of review for questions arising from the decisionmaker’s home statute; it stopped treating pre-Dunsmuir jurisprudence as authoritative on the
appropriate standard of review; and it effectively eliminated questions of jurisdiction. In this
section, we argue that these changes streamline the approach to judicial review. But they are more
than simple, incremental doctrinal developments. Rather, they reflect an underlying conceptual
shift in the Court’s understanding of its role in conducting judicial review. As we explain, this
new architecture of the standard of review analysis reflects a deeper commitment to sharing the
task of law-interpretation with administrative decision-makers and undermines the remaining
vestiges of the Dunsmuir framework.
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Justice Rothstein changed the standard of review analysis by creating a presumption of
reasonableness for issues requiring interpretation of the administrative decision-maker’s home
statute. Rothstein established this presumption in Alberta Teachers’ Association, stating that “the
interpretation by the tribunal of ‘its own statute or statutes closely connected to its function, with
which it will have particular familiarity’ should be presumed to be a question of statutory
interpretation subject to deference on judicial review.”38
This presumption of reasonableness has been adopted by a unanimous Court on multiple
occasions, and has been explicitly endorsed by Justice Rothstein’s Supreme Court colleagues.39
Alberta Teachers’ Association effectively replaced the two-step framework set out by the
majority in Dunsmuir. Rather than looking to precedent and then the nature of the question, as per
Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court now follows Alberta Teachers’ Association and applies
reasonableness as the default standard of review. If the issue arises from the decision-maker’s
home statute, this presumption can be rebutted by a contextual analysis of the governing statute.40
Or, if the issue fits into a pre-determined category—the constitutionality of a law, a question of
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general importance to the legal system, or an issue about competing jurisdictions of specialized
tribunals—correctness will apply.41
Justice Rothstein defended this presumption by stating that he was merely making
explicit what was already implicit in Dunsmuir.42 However, the presumption is accompanied by
two additional doctrinal developments that have come to replace aspects of the Dunsmuir
framework. First, the presumption means that the Court no longer treats pre-Dunsmuir case law
as authoritative on the appropriate standard of review.43 Immediately following Dunsmuir, the
Supreme Court followed its framework, and considered the effect of prior cases in determining
the standard of review. And shortly after Khosa, Justice Rothstein, writing for a unanimous Court,
relied on pre-Dunsmuir jurisprudence to establish that a question of jurisdiction was subject to
correctness review.44 Yet the presumption of reasonableness seems now to override any need to
consider pre-Dunsmuir precedent. Indeed, only in instances where pre-Dunsmuir cases
established reasonableness as the appropriate standard has the Supreme Court followed
precedent.45 In contrast, when tribunals, lower courts and litigants have attempted to rely on preDunsmuir correctness precedents, the Supreme Court has consistently overturned these decisions
to rely instead on the presumption of reasonableness. 46 When the issue pertains to the
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interpretation of the decision-maker’s home statute, it seems there is no longer any reason for the
courts to examine pre-Dunsmuir precedent on the appropriate standard of review.47
The second doctrinal development arising from the presumption of reasonableness is the
virtual elimination of questions of jurisdiction. In Alberta Teachers’ Association, Justice
Rothstein observed that the residual category of “true questions of jurisdiction” has continued to
confuse and confound lawyers and judges.48 He speculated that true jurisdictional questions are
perhaps only mythical creatures of administrative law, observed that the Supreme Court had not
identified a single one post-Dunsmuir, 49 and that he – as with judges before him – could not
articulate a definition of a true question of jurisdiction.50 While he left open the possibility that a
true question of jurisdiction may exist, his development of the presumption of reasonableness
sought to eliminate the unnecessary confusion arising from attempts to cast issues as
jurisdictional.
The Supreme Court has continued in this vein by consistently rejecting arguments that
questions of law are true questions of jurisdiction.51 Notably departing from a long line of
precedent on jurisdictional questions, a unanimous Court found that the legislative authority of
municipalities is subject to reasonableness review, and not review for vires. 52 In 2012 a
unanimous Court also overturned the long-standing Bell v Ontario (Human Rights Commission)
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decision – the original case on jurisdictional questions.53 In only one post-Alberta Teachers’
Association case did we detect a possible jurisdictional question, albeit in disguise.54
Justice Rothstein took a leading role in reshaping the architecture of judicial review along
these three lines. By developing the presumption of reasonableness, minimizing – if not
eliminating – the temptation to resort to questions of jurisdiction, and rendering unnecessary the
need to examine pre-Dunsmuir precedent, Rothstein considerably streamlined the framework for
determining the appropriate standard of review. He maintained throughout his decisions that these
three developments were all “natural extensions” of Dunsmuir. 55 Indeed, one can read his
administrative law jurisprudence in this way. He did not disrupt the other residual categories of
correctness identified in Dunsmuir:56 constitutional questions,57 questions of central importance to
the legal system,

58

and questions regarding the competing jurisdiction of specialized

administrative bodies. Yet it is also true that these residual categories seem to be, like questions
of true jurisdiction, losing any practical significance. In only one case since the Alberta Teachers’
Association decision has the Court identified a question of general importance.59 The presumption
of reasonableness now also applies when courts review administrative decisions that implicate
Charter values.60
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In light of this, it is worth examining the deeper conceptual move that Rothstein made in
developing a new, simplified approach to determining the standard of review. While these may
appear to be incremental doctrinal changes, collectively they make significant strides in resolving
the normative problem underpinning judicial review.
Part I of this article introduced the Diceyan understanding of judicial review, which
presumed a judicial monopoly over legal interpretation, and argued that, since CUPE, the
Supreme Court has maintained that it cannot defend that monopoly while also taking seriously the
legitimacy of the administrative state. But at the same time, the Court has struggled to articulate a
clear division of labour between courts and administrative decision-makers over questions of law.
Justice Rothstein took up this challenge. His solution requires judges to further cede their judicial
monopoly and it encourages judges to understand administrative decision-makers as full partners
in the interpretive exercise of elaborating the content of the law.
First, Justice Rothstein’s presumption of reasonableness clearly signals to courts and
administrative decision-makers that they share the task of legal interpretation. Respectful
partnership should be the starting point for judicial review, not a concession that judges make in
exceptional cases. This mindset of judicial respect for administrative decision-making is
supported by the fact that pre-Dunsmuir correctness cases seem to hold little precedential value
under the new framework for judicial review. Abandoning the commitment to pre-Dunsmuir
precedent on the proper standard of review reflects the fact that prior judicial decisions did not
approach their reviewing task with an appropriately respectful mindset. In short, the presumption
of reasonableness (and the concomitant disutility of pre-Dunsmuir precedent) is more than just
analytical tidiness. It is rather a strong statement about the legitimacy of administrative decisionmakers as interpreters of the law.
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Second, Justice Rothstein’s skepticism about the existence of true questions of
jurisdiction undermines the idea, implicit in CUPE, that there ought to be or even can be a
division of labour between administrative decision-makers and courts. Rothstein wrote, “In one
sense, anything a tribunal does that involves the interpretation of its home statute involves the
determination of whether it has the authority or jurisdiction to do what is being challenged on
judicial view.”61 In other words, it is not possible to distinguish a subset of questions of law that
go to the tribunal’s jurisdiction from regular questions of statutory interpretation. This means that
a partnership between courts and administrative decision-makers cannot be achieved through a
division of labour, one in which the administrative decision-makers interpret everything inside
the boundaries and the courts interpret at the boundaries. Rather, under Justice Rothstein’s
approach, the interpretive authority of administrative decision-makers and courts are co-extensive.
Letting go of the concept of jurisdictional questions means that judges must also let go of the idea
that judges possess some inalienable core monopoly over questions of law.
Justice Rothstein’s architecture for identifying standard of review is not perfect. He
maintained that there are a few final bastions of the old judicial monopoly. Constitutional
questions and “general questions of importance to the legal system” could become jurisdictional
questions reincarnate, although as noted previously the Court does not currently seem inclined to
treat them that way. As Justice Cromwell rightly noted in his concurring reasons in Alberta
Teachers’ Association, there is something bigger afoot in Rothstein’s rejection of the concept of
questions of jurisdiction.62 Once judges accept that administrative decision-makers are legitimate
partners in the project of interpreting law, there is no reason not to extend this thinking to
constitutional questions and general questions of importance. Respecting administrative decisionmakers as partners in decision-making means that judges ought to recognize that cogently
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reasoned administrative decisions always offer some insight into how the content of the law ought
to be elaborated.
Recall that this view resolves the tension between the rule of law and legislative
supremacy by conceiving of judicial review as part of a democratic conception of the rule of law.
By ensuring that administrative decision-makers publicly justify their decisions, judges respect
the legislature’s delegation of front-line authority to specialized institutions while also protecting
citizens from arbitrary (i.e. unreasonable) decisions. Indeed, Rothstein seemed to recognize this
shift in the judicial role: from one of policing the boundaries of the statute, to one of ensuring that
all administrative decisions are reasonable.63 On this understanding of judicial review, judges
substitute their own view – not because they are the sole guardians of the rule of law – but rather
because the administrative decision-maker has failed to adequately justify its decision.
The Supreme Court has not yet completed this shift (and indeed there is no guarantee that
it ever will). But we can now see how Justice Rothstein’s changes to the architecture of judicial
review have moved us much closer to an understanding of judicial review that resolves both the
practical and normative problems of judicial review. The new, simplified framework presumes
that administrative decision-makers are legitimate partners in elaborating the content of the law. It
minimizes the significance of the standard of review analysis, which allows courts to focus on the
actual decision at issue. And it contains a much greater scope for the courts to pay respectful
attention to the reasoning of administrative decision-makers. We now turn to whether Justice
Rothstein’s application of reasonableness reflected this kind of respectful attention.
c. Rothstein on Reasons and Reasonableness
Justice Rothstein’s approach to the standard of review analysis thus addresseed two
aspects of complexity in administrative law: it focused the court’s attention on the substance of
63
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the decision at issue, and it signaled that administrative decision-makers and courts ought to be
understood as collaborators in the project of interpreting law. The next question is how, precisely,
administrative decision-makers and courts can collaborate to ensure reasonable interpretations of
the law – what does deferential review look like in practice?64 Part I showed that Dyzenhaus
presents a coherent vision of what deferential ought to look like in actual cases. Reasonableness,
on Dyzenhaus’s view, requires administrative decision-makers to justify their decisions with
reasons and it requires courts to defer to reasons that adequately justify the outcome. The question
here is whether Rothstein followed through on his recognition of administrative decision-makers
as collaborators in legal interpretation by deferring when their decisions were justified.
Before addressing Justice Rothstein’s jurisprudence, a bit more needs to be said about the
judicial concept of reasonableness and its relationship to Dyzenhaus's notion of deference as
respect. There are a number of instances in which the Supreme Court has applied reasonableness
that are inconsistent with the idea of deference as respect and it is important to state this at the
outset to guide the analysis of Justice Rothstein’s reasoning about reasonableness.
Recall that in Dunsmuir, the majority of the Supreme Court identified two facets of
reasonableness. First, they stated, “reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process.” Second, a
reasonable decision is one that “falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes…”65 This
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second facet is inconsistent with a judicial commitment to deference as respect. It restates the
traditional judicial monopoly over interpreting law in which judges get to determine the range of
acceptable outcomes using their own legal tools of statutory interpretation. When judges
understand reasonableness in this way, it risks collapsing into the “free rein within boundaries”
approach to review that characterized the pre-CUPE era of review. If a court determines that the
statute admits a range of reasonable interpretations, then “anything goes” within that range. In
contrast, if the court determines there is only one reasonable interpretation, then reasonableness
collapses into correctness.
Recall that deference as respect resolves this problem by focusing on the reasons offered
for the decision. Thus the Dunsmuir idea that reasonableness is primarily concerned with
justification, transparency and intelligibility reflects the deference-as-respect ambition that there
can be a middle-ground collaboration between administrative decision-makers and courts. But we
still must be attentive to how judges understand this role. It cannot be the case that any set of
reasons will be sufficient to immunize a decision from judicial intervention. Judges must, on this
approach, require actual justification of the decision. 66 Failing this would be tantamount to
judicial abdication. Judges must be prepared to engage with the substance of the decision to
ensure it is justified. But, at the same time, judges must resist the temptation to seize on every gap
or flaw in administrative reasoning in order to intervene. Paying respectful attention to the
administrative decision-maker’s reasons, in other words, is far from straightforward.67 And it is
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only complicated by the fact that the reasons offered by administrative decision-makers are often
incomplete.68
Justice Rothstein was largely able navigate that careful middle ground in assessing the
reasonableness of administrative decisions. Two decisions, in particular, exemplify his implicit
commitment to deference as respect. The first exemplar comes, perhaps surprisingly, from the
Alberta Teachers’ Association decision itself. This is surprising because in that case the
administrative decision-maker had not addressed or given reasons for its implicit decision that s.
50(5)(a) of the Personal Information Protection Act, 69 which allowed the decision-maker to
extend the 90 day period for an inquiry, also allowed the decision-maker to grant that extension
after the expiry of the 90 days. Writing for a unanimous court on this issue, Rothstein relied on
other decisions by the decision-maker in which they had considered this question, noting that “a
review of the reasons of the Commissioner and the adjudicators in other cases allows the Court to
determine without difficulty that a reasonable basis exists for the adjudicator’s implied decision
in this case.” 70 While his decision addressed arguments brought by the Alberta Teachers’
Association challenging the interpretation,71 he relied almost entirely on the analysis of the
administrative decision-maker itself to uphold its decision.72 He reproduced and relied upon the
reasoning in earlier decisions, explained why the approach taken in those decisions provided a
reasonable justification for the approach taken and, in general, avoided undertaking an
independent analysis of the legal issues.
The second exemplar of Justice Rothstein’s approach is his dissent, co-written with
Justice Moldaver, in Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v
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Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd.73 They argued that a decision by a labour arbitrator invalidating a
random alcohol-testing program was unreasonable. Their basis for doing so, however, is
revelatory.. Rothstein and Moldaver were concerned with the fact that the arbitrator’s invalidation
of the random alcohol-testing program departed from the “arbitral consensus” with respect to
what must be done to justify such testing. And while, on their view, the arbitrator was free to
depart from this consensus, what rendered the decision unreasonable was the arbitration board’s
failure to justify its decision to do so.74 In other words, they intervened in the administrative
decision, but their basis for doing so was the connection between the decision at issue and preexisting arbitral jurisprudence. Justices Rothstein and Moldaver did not substitute their own
reasoning, but paid careful attention to the arbitral jurisprudence and sought to interpret this
jurisprudence as a coherent whole. It was the Arbitration Board’s failure to reconcile its outcome
with prior arbitral decisions, Rothstein and Moldaver that made its decision unreasonable.75
The majority in Irving upheld the Arbitration Board’s decision, noting the
comprehensiveness of its reasons. The majority suggested that Rothstein and Moldaver had
conducted a “line-by-line treasure hunt for error.”76 The majority continued, “[i]n the absence of
finding that the decision, based on the record, is outside the range of reasonable outcomes, the
decision should not be disturbed.”77 As we have seen, however, simply finding that a reasoned
decision falls inside a range of reasonable outcomes does not resolve the normative challenge of
judicial review because it relies on the implicit judicial monopoly whereby judges get the
definitive say on the boundaries of the legislation (i.e. the range of permissible outcomes).
Moreover, it does not require decision-makers to actually justify their decisions to those they
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affect. The willingness of Justices Rothstein and Moldaver to engage with decision-maker’s
reasons and query whether those reasons justified the outcome better reflects a commitment to
full collaboration between administrative decision-makers and courts.
This requirement that judges conduct a close analysis of the administrative decisionmaker’s reasons raises the specter of judicial interventionism. Elsewhere, Justice Rothstein nicely
captured the idea that a reviewing judge must engage with a tribunal’s decisions but without a
view to finding fault. In Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access
Copyright),78 Rothstein dissented (with Justices Deschamps, Fish, and Cromwell) and would have
upheld the decision by the Copyright Board that photocopying by teachers constituted fair dealing.
In his reasons, Justice Rothstein quoted extensively from the Board’s decision, and relied upon it
to frame and direct his analysis of the issues. He was not uncritical of aspects of the Tribunal’s
reasoning, but ultimately concluded:
Tribunal decisions can certainly be found to be unreasonable …However, I do not
think it is open on a deferential review, where a tribunal’s decision is multifactored
and complex, to seize upon a few arguable statements or intermediate findings to
conclude that the overall decision is unreasonable. This is especially the case where
the issues are fact-based, as in the case of a fair dealing analysis.79
In other words, Rothstein did not seek to hold the decision-maker to a standard of perfection.
Rather, he sought to determine whether the reasons as a whole justified the decision.
Justice Rothstein also demonstrated a willingness to defer on matters of human rights
protection, an area in which courts have struggled to exercise restraint and defer. 80 In
Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the Human Rights Act’s prohibition of publications that expose people to
hatred or ridicule, or which belittle or otherwise affront the dignity of any person, as well as the
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determination by the Human Rights Tribunal that Whatcott’s publications violated the Act.81
Justice Rothstein, writing for a unanimous court, applied a correctness standard to the
constitutional issue but – contrary to the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench and Court of
Appeal – applied a reasonableness standard to the determination that Whatcott’s publications
violated the Act. In applying reasonableness, he approached the application of the Act through
the Tribunal’s own reasoning. He relied on the Tribunal’s analysis of the problematic aspects of
the pamphlets published by Whatcott and relied on their assessment of the pamphlets except
where they acted unreasonably by failing to apply the legislation in accordance with earlier
Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Whatcott decision did not submit to the Tribunal’s reasoning,
and held aspects of it to be unreasonable, but it paid respectful attention to the justifications the
Tribunal offered.
We find considerable support in Justice Rothstein’s jurisprudence for the view that his
architecture for judicial review results in increased respect for the reasoning of administrative
decision-makers.82 In each of the decisions discussed here he did not independently analyze the
legal decision before the court to determine whether it fell within what the court viewed as the
range of justifiable outcomes. He did not focus on judicial precedent. Rather, he focused on the
reasons offered by the decision-maker, in this case or in others, to assess whether the decision had
been properly justified – to determine whether, in that sense, the decision was reasonable. When
viewed as a whole, Justice Rothstein’s jurisprudence achieves its potential. His decisions do not
get bogged down in determining the appropriate standard of review, concentrating instead on the
actual issues brought to the court for its review. Further, and importantly, they focus on the
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justifications offered by administrative decision-makers, respectfully but not uncritically
reviewing those justifications to determine if they satisfy a standard of reasonableness.
Having said that, it must be noted that in three of his opinions, Justice Rothstein
effectively undertook de novo consideration of legal issues before the decision-maker while
applying a reasonableness standard, and did not meaningfully rely on the reasoning of the
administrative decision-maker to determine whether the decision it had reached was reasonable.83
As the next section will demonstrate, these departures appear to have arisen from Justice
Rothstein’s attempt to resolve particular pragmatic challenges that those cases presented – to
ensure that judicial review produced an efficient, effective and fair resolution of the specific issue
brought to the court. The question that the following section will consider is whether, in doing so,
Rothstein’s jurisprudence undermined its apparent commitment to deference as respect and its
requirement that administrative decision-makers actually justify their decisions to those who are
affected by them.
d. Normative Resolution, Practical Complexities
We have argued that Dyzenhaus’s ideal of deference as respect resolves the normative
complexities of judicial review. It also resolves some of the practical complexities, such as the
uncertainty surrounding the appropriate standard of review when that standard is up for
determination in each case. But additional practical complexities emerge that can complicate a
court’s adherence to deference as respect.

Specifically, courts face practical challenges in

following a model of deference as respect in those cases where the original administrative
decision offers inadequate or no reasons.

The Supreme Court has committed to reviewing

decisions for reasonableness even where there are no formal reasons, whether because the reasons
are inadequate due to insufficiencies of the administrative decision-maker or because the issue
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that now appears salient was not fully aired by the parties in the original proceeding. This
commitment is understandable on pragmatic grounds, but creates meaningful issues for ensuring
a coherent and consistent approach to judicial review.84
In those cases, there may be no reasoning or justificatory process to which the court can
defer. Yet if the court reasons through the issues itself and substitutes its own interpretation, then
it shuts the administrative decision-maker out of the law-interpretation process. It also denies the
parties the reasons – or justification – for the decision that they were entitled to in the first
instance by the administrative decision-maker. But if the court simply remits the decision back to
the administrative decision-maker it risks increasing costs and delays associated with the
administrative process. This invites parties who benefit from delay to seize on any inadequately
reasoned aspect of an administrative decision, thereby increasing the risk of strategic litigation
and challenges. When one bears in mind that the administrative state was developed in significant
part as a response to the costs and inefficiencies of traditional judicial processes, these risks
cannot be lightly dismissed.
These pragmatic difficulties are apparent in Justice Rothstein’s administrative law
jurisprudence. In some cases he was able to work around the problem, offering respectful
deference despite insufficiencies in the reasons. In Alberta Teachers’ Association, for example,
Rothstein assessed an administrative decision in the context of other decisions issued by the
decision-maker. In that way, while he was not able to defer to the decision of the specific
decision-maker in the case, he still focused on the justifications offered by the administrative
decision-maker.
In other cases Justice Rothstein had more difficulties. In ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v
Alberta (Utilities Commission), for example, Justice Rothstein conducted an independent
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statutory analysis to determine the reasonableness of the decision.85 He upheld the decision of the
Alberta Utilities Commission disallowing part of ATCO’s inclusion of cost of living adjustments
in its pension costs. The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Commission
acted properly in not using a “no-hindsight prudence test” to determine which costs ATCO could
recover. The Commission itself never expressly considered the applicability of such a test and
based on a review of the Commission’s decision it is not apparent that ATCO or any other party
argued that it ought to do so.86 Its “decision” not to use a no-hindsight prudence test was at best
implicit in the reasons – or perhaps simply outside their ambit.87
Faced with this absence of express consideration of the issue, attending to the
Commission’s reasons would not have proven fruitful. Most of the discussion in the original
decision addressed specific arguments related to the treatment of the costs in question; it did not
address in any real way the overarching legal test later alleged by the utility to govern the
Commission’s decision. It is not obvious how Rothstein could have found in a decision, which
never addressed or even contemplated the “no hindsight” test, any justification for why the
Commission’s rejection of that test could be viewed as reasonable. Had Rothstein held the
decision reasonable without resolving the specific question of statutory interpretation, he would
have neglected the Court’s obligation to offer adequate justification for its own decision, an
obligation that includes responding to arguments raised by the parties.
The problem, though, is that in concluding that “[t]he existence of a reasonable
interpretation that supports the Commission’s implied understanding of its discretion is enough
85
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for the Commission’s decision to pass muster under reasonableness review,”88 Rothstein imposed
no obligation on, and created no incentive for, the Commission to justify its decision. The
problem was not that he found the Commission’s decision reasonable, but rather that his
independent analysis cut the administrative decision-maker out of the interpretive process. It
further ignored the fact that the affected individuals were entitled to actual justification in the first
instance, not simply the assurance that such a reasonable interpretation exists in the abstract.
On the other hand, what practical alternative did Justice Rothstein have? The only way to
encourage proper justification by the administrative decision-maker would have been to remit the
matter back to the Commission for further review. But that approach has enormous costs – it
ensures that a decision made four years prior to the Supreme Court’s own consideration remains
unresolved for perhaps several years more. It increases costs and uncertainty for every party to
the matter, particularly in the event of future appeals. Further, while it may encourage the
regulator to justify its reasons properly, it also has the potential to encourage abusive conduct by
parties to the regulatory decision. Parties could search for novel arguments in a judicial review
application, knowing that even if those arguments are not in substance accepted on judicial
review, the administrative decision-maker’s failure to consider them may nonetheless allow for
delay in the implementation of the administrative decision.

The risk of strategic abuse looms

large.
The Commission in ATCO did not act in bad faith; it did not hear an argument and then
simply choose to ignore it. Rather, it justified its decision in response to the arguments that the
parties presented to it; it may have made some assumptions in those justifications that could have
been better explained, but it was also not asked for those explanations. In short, this is not a case
where the problem was an ignorant or insufficiently motivated administrative decision-maker. It
was just an unfortunate outcome arising from a confluence of circumstances – the arguments
88

ATCO, supra note 39 at para 47.

36

made to the administrative decision-maker, the prominence given to the no-hindsight prudence
test by the Ontario Court of Appeal in an analogous case, and the arguable applicability of that
test to the issue in ATCO Gas. When viewed in that light, Rothstein’s approach – of conducting
an independent analysis to assess whether the approach of the Commission was in substance
reasonable – may have been the least bad alternative. The Court could not respectfully defer to
the Commission’s reasons, but it did pay careful attention to the context from which the issue
arose. Moreover, it is not clear that ATCO was denied adequate justification for the decision,
given the issue was one that ATCO did not raise before the Commission despite ample
opportunity to do so.
Insufficient reasoning also arose in relation to Justice Rothstein’s decision in Canadian
National v Canada (Attorney General),89 where the subject of review was an Order in Council by
the Governor in Council. While the Order in Council constituted the “reasons” for the decision,
they were not comparable to the kind of detailed reasons offered by, for example, an arbitration
board,90 or required of a Minister issuing a deportation order.91 The Order in Council did not offer
reasons explaining the scope of its statutory authority; instead it simply presumed that the
Governor in Council could decide questions of law. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Rothstein found the Order in Council was reasonable. But, as with ATCO, he had to do quite a bit
of independent interpretive work both to justify the Governor in Council’s authority over
questions of law and its exercise of that authority in the specific instance.
Again, Rothstein could not respectfully defer to the reasoning of the Governor in Council.
However, his reasons contained other indications that he was nonetheless oriented toward the
underlying concerns of deference as respect. Most significantly, he held that the Order in Council
was subject to substantive judicial review, rather than the more limited review for vires that
89
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would have precluded review of the substance of the decision.92 The possibility of substantive
review, in principle, ought to encourage the Governor in Council to reason more thoroughly in
future cases to prevent its decisions from being overturned. And, while he could have remitted the
matter back to the Governor in Council for better consideration, we ought to question whether it
would have been worth the additional delay and expense for the particular issue in this case. The
issue was whether the parties had access to a specialized dispute-resolution tribunal. Upholding
the Governor in Council’s decision enabled the parties to focus on the substance of the dispute –
the effect of the new tariff on the shipping contracts – rather than the manner of its review.
Deference as respect also becomes practically difficult where there is limited
participation on judicial review – where only the party challenging the decision is properly
represented, either because of the diffusion of interests on the other side, or a lack of resources.
In that case, while a court can still focus on the reasons offered by the administrative decisionmaker, the court’s consideration may be distorted by the absence of a full airing of the issues;
what may appear to be inadequacies in the justifications offered by the administrative decisionmaker in the first instance might seem quite different when considered from another point of view.
A court may be tempted to undertake its own independent analysis as a check on its assessment of
the reasonableness of the reasons offered by the administrative decision-maker but, in so doing, it
will not offer the deference that it ought to offer. On the other hand, if it does not take some steps
to ameliorate the inadequacies in the presentation of the case, it risks being unduly influenced by
the party that has superior representation in court.
This was of particular concern in Ontario (Energy Board) v Ontario Power Generation
Inc,93 where only the utility appeared as a party on judicial review and, like in ATCO, the question
regarding the applicability of the no-hindsight prudence test had not been rigorously explored in
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the original hearing. In Ontario Power, the utility had explicitly raised the no-hindsight test in
argument, 94 but the Board had addressed it only indirectly by acknowledging that “[i]n
determining the appropriate adjustment, the Board recognizes that it will be difficult for OPG to
make significant savings through compensation levels alone in the short to medium-term given
the collective agreements with its unions.”95 That limitation in the Board’s reasoning, when
combined with the one-sided nature of the argument brought before the Court, created the
potential to undermine the Court’s ability to defer appropriately.
Justice Rothstein addressed this problem by shifting the Court’s focus to whether
administrative decision-makers ought to be granted standing as parties to the judicial review
application. Rothstein took the position that courts ought to grant standing to administrative
decision-makers on a discretionary basis, and they ought to do so in significant part because of
the ability of such decision-makers to contribute to the court’s analysis and interpretation of the
law:
Because of their expertise and familiarity with the relevant administrative scheme,
tribunals may in many cases be well positioned to help the reviewing court reach a
just outcome. For example, a tribunal may be able to explain how one interpretation
of a statutory provision might impact other provisions within the regulatory scheme,
or to the factual and legal realities of the specialized field in which they work.
Submissions of this type may be harder for other parties to present.96
Rothstein recognized the risks with a decision-maker’s participation, and cautioned against
permitting participation by any decision-maker “whose function it is to adjudicate individual
conflicts between two or more parties” since such participation could undermine “fairness, real
and perceived.”97
Justice Rothstein also discussed issues related to “bootstrapping” – the concern that an
administrative decision-maker might change or add to its reasons during the course of a judicial
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review and might, as a consequence, create unfairness or be less inclined to offer proper
justifications in the first instance.98 Rothstein concluded that a tribunal ought not to have an
“unfettered” ability to raise new arguments, but that it should be allowed to participate in a way
that would allow them to “offer interpretations of their reasons or conclusions and to make
arguments implicit within their original reasons.”99
In the end, in dealing with the substantive question at issue in Ontario Power, Rothstein’s
judgment was partially deferential. He undertook an independent analysis of whether the nohindsight prudence test was applicable to every decision made by the Ontario Energy Board, and
in that analysis did not consider the administrative decision at all.100 But in reviewing its decision
on the specific costs at issue, he did focus on the Board’s reasons, and on whether it had
sufficiently justified its disallowance of the costs claimed by the utility.101 In this decision as well,
then, Justice Rothstein did not approach the administrative decision in a way that fully accords
with deference as respect; he instead compensated for the limitations in the Board’s reasons and
the limitations in the arguments before the court by independently analyzing some issues, and by
allowing the Board to participate as a party to the judicial review. As was the case in ATCO, the
Court’s approach does not encourage the Board to give adequate reasons to those affected by its
decisions. And in this case it does so without some of the rationale that existed in ATCO. Here
the no-hindsight prudence test was brought to the Board’s attention, and it is arguable that they
could have provided sufficient justification in the original decision.

By allowing them to

participate as a party, and by using the Court’s process to bolster the original reasons given by the
Board, the Court effectively let the Board off the hook in providing the necessary justification to
the parties.
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Again, though, what alternative to this approach would have been better? Remitting the
matter back to the Board may have incentivized them to provide more pointed reasons next time.
But at the end of the day, the approach they took to the specific issue was assessed as reasonable
on a deferential review, and even with the no-hindsight prudence test being raised by the party,
the Board may simply not have appreciated the need to explicitly address why they were not
applying it. They may have felt that their general discussion of why the costs were being
excluded from the utility’s rate recovery was sufficient – an assessment which, in the end,
Rothstein found was justified. Remitting the matter back for further consideration would have
increased costs and delay, and created the same perverse incentives identified above in discussing
ATCO.
In each of these cases, then, it is possible to explain and defend the approach taken by
Justice Rothstein, and not just because it solved a practical problem. It also helped to ensure that
the parties affected by an administrative decision received an appropriate result in a timely
fashion, and that parties would not be encouraged to engage in strategic and potentially abusive
challenges to a regulatory decision.
At the same time, however, these cases sound a cautionary note. It will always be the
case that the Court supplementing a decision with its own reasons will be more efficient and bring
a more timely resolution for the parties than would remitting the decision back to the
administrative decision-maker for further explanation. The challenge for the Court is to
understand when supplying reasons that the decision-maker could have offered but did not,
undermines deference as respect. As Justice Rothstein’s decisions evidence, this requires
considerable judicial sensitivity to the context in which the decision-maker operates. There is real
risk that Rothstein’s approach in each of these three cases could be misapplied if lifted whole
cloth to different decision-making contexts. As Rothstein’s reasons nicely illustrate, interpretive
contexts vary. An energy regulator is not the same as an immigration official. The issues, the
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stakes and the parties are all part of the context in which the court assesses the reasonableness of
the administrative decision.

Conclusion

The architecture of judicial review that Justice Rothstein helped to construct is fragile,
and only constant attention from the courts to the values he pursued – focusing on the substantive
issue at stake instead of administrative law technicalities, respecting administrative decisionmakers as legal interpreters, and focusing on the sufficiency of the justifications they give – will
allow it to be maintained. The pitfalls present in the history of administrative law, of a binary
approach to review that is at different times unduly interventionist and unduly hands-off, and of
incoherent and unpredictable decisions, remain ever present, and will be avoided only through
vigilance.
That vigilance need not involve philosophical musings by judges. As this article has
made clear, focusing on pragmatic concerns – ensuring that parties to an application receive a
timely and effective resolution of their case, ensuring that administrative decision-makers can do
their jobs without undue judicial interference, and ensuring that individuals receive adequate
justifications for the decisions that affect them – may well allow the Court to continue to build on
Rothstein’s legacy of practicing respectful deference. There is no problem with pragmatism,
provided that it – like Rothstein’s approach – focuses on the right concerns and considerations.
Justice Rothstein moved the Court in the direction of resolving the normative and
practical complexities that are at the root of every application for judicial review. Like
Dyzenhaus’s model of deference as respect, Rothstein sought to resolve these complexities by

42

minimizing the role of the standard of review analysis, by pushing administrative decisionmakers to articulate cogent reasons for their decisions, and deferring to these reasons when they
justify the decision made. At the same time, Rothstein’s overall commitment to pragmatism in
judicial review allowed him to remain sensitive to the particular context of the administrative
decision and the potential for strategic litigation and perverse effects. When determining whether
a decision was reasonable, he sacrificed theoretical purity while remaining oriented to the
underlying concern of ensuring individuals received a clear justification for the administrative
decisions that affected them.
In the end, though, this discussion of Justice Rothstein’s jurisprudence also gives reason
for caution in predicting a positive future for judicial review. As the Court’s own history
demonstrates, and as the practical challenges dealt with in some of Rothstein’s own decisions
indicate, maintaining an attitude of respectful deference is hard. It requires a Court to be modest
in its beliefs about its own competence, and to respect the knowledge and judgment of others,
while at the same time not being so subservient to others that it allows itself to be party to an
unreasonable or unjust decision. To build on Rothstein’s legacy, and to avoid repeating the
mistakes that preceded him, the Court has its work cut out for it.
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